*an opinion piece contributed by CTC panelist Anita Kellogg
When discussing international politics with those outside of academia, the argument that we can't negotiate with (insert leader of choice) because they are crazy, always surprises me the most. It is surprising because the assumption that states are rational actors is foundational to international relations and foreign policy making. Of course, it must be understood, that the concept of rationality in economics and political science differs from popular usage. At its most basic, the assumption of a rational actor means that said actor can be expected to act in his/her own best interest. In the case of states, this means they should foremost be concerned with preserving the security and integrity of the state. In the case of politicians, we expect that their primary goal is to stay in power (which also means securing the security of their state).
It is important to point out that according to this definition, the leader may be an atrocious violator of human rights and otherwise a complete sociopath. However, in dealing with said leader we will not expect him/her to act in a way that would recklessly endanger the security of the state, unless in the very rare case that particular leader has displayed such reckless behavior in the past. Off hand, I cannot think of an example of a leader behaving this way on the international stage, but I also cannot deny its exceedingly rare possibility.
In terms of current events, the assumption of rationality means that one cannot take seriously the possibility that Iran would use a nuclear weapon on Israel, because Israel's own supply of nuclear weapons means that retaliation would most likely result in the total destruction of Iran. This does not mean, however, that efforts against nuclear proliferation are meaningless or that there are not rational reasons a country might detonate a nuclear weapon. In this latter case we certainly have more to worry from a nuclear North Korea, which is teetering on the edge of being a failed state. Were the North Korean regime to become convinced of the collapse of the nation and their power, it would not necessarily be irrational to use a nuclear weapon as a last resort since they have nothing to lose by doing so. I'm not sure how likely such a scenario is, but it does point to a troubling rational explanation for the use of a nuclear weapon. I personally do not think military strikes will be effective in preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, but I do think it is worth the cost of serious sanctions and international diplomatic effort to keep Iran from going nuclear.
In sum, while it may make for some humorous entertainment to portray Kim Jong-Il and his
ilk as crazy lunatics (yes I laughed at Team America), it would be dangerous to think this way when considering foreign policy. To declare an actor irrational is to say there is no possibility of negotiation, because they are not concerned with their most basic need--survival. There may be arguments that support the use of a military option towards Iran, but the idea that Iran would risk its total destruction by attacking Israel with a nuclear weapon is not one of them.
~Anita Kellogg
CTC Panelist
